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Does Choice Mean Freedom and Well-Being?
HAZEL ROSE MARKUS
BARRY SCHWARTZ
Americans live in a political, social, and historical context that values personal
freedom and choice above all else, an emphasis that has been amplified by con-
temporary psychology. However, this article reviews research that shows that in
non-Western cultures and among working-class Westerners, freedom and choice
do not have the meaning or importance they do for the university-educated people
who have been the subjects of almost all research on this topic. We cannot assume
that choice, as understood by educated, affluent Westerners, is a universal as-
piration. The meaning and significance of choice are cultural constructions. More-
over, even when choice can foster freedom, empowerment, and independence, it
is not an unalloyed good. Too much choice can produce a paralyzing uncertainty,
depression, and selfishness. In the United States, the path to well-being may re-
quire that we strike a balance between the positive and negative consequences
of proliferating choice in every domain of life.
American society is guided by a set of assumptionsabout well-being that are so deeply embedded in most
of us that we do not realize either that we make those as-
sumptions or that there is an alternative. The assumptions
can be stated in the form of a rough syllogism:
The more freedom and autonomy people have, the greater
their well-being.
The more choice people have, the greater their freedom and
autonomy.
Therefore, the more choice people have, the greater their well-
being.
On first thought, it would seem hard to quarrel—either
logically or psychologically—with this syllogism. The
moral importance of freedom and autonomy is built into
this nation’s founding documents, and the psychological
importance of freedom and autonomy is now amply docu-
mented (e.g., Deci and Ryan 2000, 2002; Ryan and Deci
2000; Seligman 1975). Instrumentally, there is no denying
that choice improves the quality of people’s lives. It enables
people to control their destinies and to come close to getting
exactly what they want out of any situation. Whereas many
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basic needs are universal (food, shelter, medical care, social
support, education, and so on), much of what we need to
flourish is highly individualized. Choice is what enables
each person to pursue precisely those objects and activities
that best satisfy his or her own preferences within the limits
of his or her resources. Any time choice is restricted in some
way, there is bound to be someone, somewhere, who is
deprived of the opportunity to pursue something of personal
value. Increased choice in any domain seems to be what
economists call a “Pareto improvement,” in that new options
will make someone better off without making anyone worse
off.
Moreover, choice is viewed as essential to autonomy,
which is absolutely fundamental to well-being. Healthy peo-
ple want and need to direct their own lives. In modern
America, choice defines the self because choice is both the
engine of independence and the mark of independence. The
pursuit of independence organizes the flow of much of ev-
eryday middle-class life; it shapes how we raise and educate
our children, the way we relate to one another at work, what
we do on the weekends, and when and how we retire. Amer-
ican parents love and care for their dependent newborn ba-
bies, but they do so with the anticipation that their babies
will grow up, leave home, make their own way, pursue their
dreams, and develop and express their own unique potential
(Bellah et al. 1985; Markus and Kitayama 1994). To en-
courage and foster independence, parents (especially in mid-
dle-class contexts) put infants in their own cribs, and some-
times even in their own rooms. Very often, the events
recorded in their child’s baby book are milestones on the
child’s path toward self-determination: rolling over, sitting
and standing up, and walking by himself or herself. Either
directly or indirectly, these messages are echoed by teachers
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who encourage autonomy in the classroom, by employers
searching for self-starters and risk-takers, and by every form
of media.
A key feature of these messages of independence is an
emphatic stress on the right and necessity to make one’s
own choices. Choices serve to define, express, and reify the
distinct individual. Parents organize meals and family ac-
tivities around children’s imputed preferences. Providing
children with a choice is believed to be an effective way to
encourage compliance with parental directives: “Do you
want to go to bed now or take a bath and then go to bed?”
By providing frequent opportunities to choose, caretakers
signal to children the importance of the capacity for inde-
pendent choice while encouraging them to develop prefer-
ences so they can make these choices (Fiske et al. 1998).
The central themes in many domains of North American
life revolve around the availability of a wide variety of
styles, flavors, and colors that permit people to pick their
favorite and “have it your way.” When ordering coffee, one
is confronted with many choices: Caffeinated or decaf?
Large, medium, or small? Organic or regular? Half and half
or whole, 2%, or nonfat milk? Brown sugar, refined sugar,
aspartame, or saccharin? For here or to go? Cash, debit, or
credit? Answering these questions results in a desirable cup
of coffee, yet it is also an exercise in knowing, communi-
cating, and realizing one’s preferences (Kim and Markus
1999).
Choice is a dominant theme of Internet ads and television
commercials for every product and cause: “Choose any-
thing but ordinary” (Camel cigarettes); “Choice—no woman
should be without one” (Kenneth Cole shoes); “Our mem-
bers don’t make compromises, they make choices” (Amer-
ican Association for Retired People). Choice appears to
make one a cooler and better person. Even behavior that
seems to an observer to be conformist and imitative—like
the choices teenagers make about their clothes, food, or
music—can be experienced as an expression of individu-
ality, as a stand of the self against society. For example,
one’s choice of shirt is identity expressive; it is my pref-
erence, my choice (Markus and Kitayama 2003). In North
American lives, choice seems to be the Swiss-army knife
of actions. It has multiple important and varied functions
and consequences. It allows people to separate and individ-
uate themselves, to express themselves, and to experience
themselves as active agents who control their destinies and
influence their worlds. Perhaps most important, a choice is
a sign of freedom.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously declared there are
four essential freedoms: freedom from want, freedom from
fear, freedom of worship, and freedom to express oneself.
But in the past few decades, freedom has come to mean,
almost exclusively, freedom of choice. It is this association
that connects the two statements in the opening syllogism.
Other historically important meanings of freedom have re-
ceded in popular cultural imagination. Currently, pairing
“freedom and choice” in a Google search results in 121
million hits; pairing “freedom and independence” results in
60 million hits. Searches for “freedom and speech,” “free-
dom and the press,” and “freedom and oppression” produce
many fewer entries. Given the depth and breadth of posi-
tive associations around choice in North America, the surest
way to raise suspicion about a product or program is to
suggest it might limit choice. The recent campaign against
a government-sponsored health-care plan has been focused
squarely on choice. For example, in full-page ads in the New
York Times, the Cato Institute on Health Care Reform asked,
“Should government bureaucrats make your health care
choices for you?”
In this article, we will argue that however reasonable the
syllogism that opened this article is, however consistent it
is with past psychological research and theory, and however
well it conforms to modern, lay understanding, it is false.
It is false for two reasons. First, research comparing people
from different parts of the globe or from different social
classes within the United States shows us that the relation-
ship between choice, freedom, autonomy, and well-being is
complex. The picture presented by a half century of research
may present an accurate picture of the psychological im-
portance of choice, freedom, and autonomy among middle-
class, college-educated Americans, but this is a picture that
leaves about 95% of the world’s population outside its frame
(Arnett 2008; Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, forthcom-
ing; Markus and Kitayama 1991). Moreover, it is a picture
without perspective; it has yet to include the consequences,
many of them unforeseen, of a society that privileges per-
sonal choice and individual freedom and autonomy above
all other moral goods. Second, even among those for whom
choice is essential, the relationship between choice and well-
being is also complex. There can be too much freedom and
too much choice, especially with respect to characteristics
of the self (Schwartz 2009).
WHY IS CHOICE SO SIGNIFICANT? THE
ROLE OF CULTURE AND CLASS
Understanding why choice is viewed so positively re-
quires a wide-angle lens that puts North America in global
as well as historical perspective. North American society is
fundamentally individualist in character, and choice fuels
this individualism (Bellah et al. 1985; Markus and Kitayama
1991). In core values and beliefs—in legal and political
systems, in educational and caretaking practices, and even
in interpersonal relationships—Americans in the United
States reveal a particular commonsense understanding of
what it means to be a person. Born in revolution, America
and Americans are famous for their independence—doing
their own thing, having it their way, being captains of their
ships and their fates. The idea that they are in control of
and responsible for their own actions is pervasive and very
highly valued. People are understood to be independent in-
dividuals who are or at least should try to be free from the
constraints of history, other people, and society. According
to this way of thinking, each individual has her own private
set of preferences, motives, attitudes, abilities, and goals.
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And this unique set of attributes guides and motivates
thoughts, feelings, and actions.
The idea of the independent and self-determining indi-
vidual is central not just to Americans’ sense of self but
also to our systems of government, law, finance, and health
care. The most treasured U.S. ideals—freedom, equality,
self-governance, and the pursuit of happiness—are based
on the idea of the “free” individual who has the right to
govern himself or herself and to pursue the achievement of
his or her full potential. The idea of the autonomous indi-
vidual is an idea that underlies the “reasonable man” of the
law, the “rational self-interested actor” of economics, and
the “authentic self ” of counseling and clinical psychology
(Schwartz 1986).
Another Way to Be a Good Self?
The model of the self as independent and freely choosing
is so deeply ingrained in the North American way of life
that it is hard to see it as a historical and philosophical
product that came into being over the course of several
centuries or to imagine that there could be other models of
how to be a self. Models of the self, like water to fish or
the air that we breathe, are difficult to see. Yet outside mid-
dle-class North American contexts, there are other models
for how to be a person (Fiske et al. 1998; Markus, Mullally,
and Kitayama 1997; Miller 2003). In many societies and
communities, for example, people are not viewed as inde-
pendent entities separate from others. Rather, they are
viewed as fundamentally interdependent or in relationship
with other people. Given this basic interdependence, a per-
son’s actions should take these important others into account
and should be responsive to the expectations and require-
ments of these others. According to this model, the self is
not a separate whole but rather a part made whole in re-
lationship with others and their actions.
In an interdependent model of the self, the individual is
not alone responsible for her own well-being or behavior;
instead, people who are interdependent bear some respon-
sibility for each other (Doi 1973; Geertz 1973; Heine 2007;
Kitayama et al. 2009; Markus and Kitayama 1991, 2003;
Triandis 1995). An interdependent model of self has long
been prevalent in many places in East and South Asia. And
recent studies reveal that a version of this model can be
found in many subcultures of the United States as well
(Stephens et al. 2009; Vandello and Cohen 1999). This
model emphasizes that the person is inherently and funda-
mentally connected to others, stressing empathy, reciprocity,
belongingness, kinship, hierarchy, loyalty, respect, polite-
ness, and social obligations. The person is expected to adjust
herself to meet others’ expectations and to work for the
good of the relationship. Well-being comes from being part
of normatively good relationships.
From the perspective of an interdependent model of self,
social relationships, roles, norms, and obligations are often
more valued than self-expression, and this understanding is
fostered in the practices and institutions of everyday life.
When evaluating an experience, people are less likely to
think about what they expected or might have hoped for
and are more likely to think about what others, particularly
significant others, might expect or prefer. From a Japanese
perspective, one’s own experience is always contingent on
others. For example, a Japanese mother does not typically
ask for a child’s preference for food or toys or clothes but
instead tries to determine what is best for the child and to
arrange it. Many Japanese schooling practices place a great
emphasis on learning to live with others in society, and
teachers emphasize the importance of discerning how others
are feeling. Punishing or reprimanding Japanese children
often involves a threat to the relationship rather than a with-
holding of privileges and the rights to exercise choice (Lewis
1995).
In East Asian contexts, ideas of interdependence, like
ideas of independence in the United States, are reflected and
distributed by a variety of institutional practices and polices.
For example, a study comparing magazine advertising in
East Asia and the United States (Kim and Markus 1999)
and analyzing thousands of ads in news, home, fashion,
youth, and business magazines corroborates this consensual
emphasis on fitting in and being part of a larger, interde-
pendent whole. While East Asian ads most commonly in-
voked themes of respect for group values, following a trend,
and harmony with others, the American ads relied most
heavily on themes of choice, freedom, uniqueness, and re-
belling against norms.
From the perspective of an interdependent self, an au-
tonomous person who insists on expressing his or her pref-
erences is immature. If flexible adaptation to the require-
ments of important others or the demands of the situation
is the goal, the habit and expectation of personal choices
can be counterproductive. A more valuable practice is the
one that encourages attending to and adjusting to others.
What is obvious from the perspective of an interdependent
model of self is that the opportunity to make a choice and
express one’s own individual preferences may not be, as it
often is in the United States, the gold standard for well-
being for individuals or for societies.
Choice as an Act of Meaning
Choice, then, is not a natural unit of behavior that has
the same significance for everyone. The meaning and sig-
nificance of choice varies with the cultural context and with
what it means to be a normatively good actor in that context
(Markus and Kitayama 2003; Snibbe and Markus 2005; Ste-
phens, Markus, and Townsend 2007). This idea has been
assessed in a number of different types of comparative stud-
ies. One of the first studies to directly test the idea that
choices serve different cultural purposes and carry different
meanings was conducted by Kim and Markus (1999). The
participants in their studies were adults at an international
airport. As a gift for completing the survey, participants were
presented with five pens and were asked to choose the pen
they liked. The pens were always presented in groups of
five. When the pens were presented in a set of four of one
color and one of another color, 78% of European Americans
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picked the unique pen. In contrast, 31% of East Asians
picked the unique pen. Similar results were obtained when
the pens were presented in a set of three of one color and
two of another—72% of European Americans chose the
relatively unique pen, whereas 15% of the East Asians chose
it. The fact that the two groups chose so differently indicates
that the act of choosing a pen had a different significance
for each group. From the perspective of an independent
model of self, choosing the pen that is different from the
others may communicate a preference for uniqueness, while
from the perspective of an interdependent model of self,
choosing the common or majority pen may communicate a
preference for being like others. Studies like this one carried
out in a number of settings confirm that North Americans
are highly distinctive in their default preferences for choos-
ing the unique pen. Participants in Hong Kong, Singapore,
and India showed a preference for the majority pen or
showed no preference (Kim and Sherman 2008; Markus
and Savani 2009).
Studies like these, of simple choices in various contexts,
are of course open to multiple interpretations. They indicate,
however, that a choice is an action, a chunk of behavior that
does not carry its own inherent meaning. Instead, a choice
derives meaning from the context in which it is made. A
study of 7–9-year-old children living in the San Francisco
Bay Area carried out by Iyengar and Lepper (1999) under-
scores this powerful difference in how people think about
choice. In this study, all of the children were native English
speakers, but some had parents who were born in East Asia,
while others had parents who were born in the United States.
Because all of the children were growing up in the United
States, they all interacted with the United States’ indepen-
dent culture and had considerable experience with the in-
dependent model of self. But the children whose parents
had grown up in East Asia—in Japan or China or Ko-
rea—also interacted with the interdependent practices of
their parents and thus also had experience with the inter-
dependent model of the self.
The experiment used a laboratory task that required all
of the children to solve word puzzles in one of three ex-
perimental conditions. In the control condition, Iyengar and
Lepper told one-third of the children which type of puzzle
to work on. They told another third—the choice condi-
tion—to choose which kind of puzzle they wanted to work
on. And for the last third—the “your mom” condition—they
gave children puzzles that their moms had chosen for them.
As virtually all choice researchers would predict, the chil-
dren of European American parents solved the most puzzles
in the choice condition—and the fewest in the “your mom”
condition. But the outcomes were different for children of
East Asian parents. These children solved the most puzzles
when they believed they were working on the ones their
moms had chosen for them. They solved more puzzles and
worked longer than did children with European American
parents who got to choose the puzzles they wanted to solve,
and they also solved more puzzles than did children who
just did the ones they were assigned. In fact, many European
American children, well on their way to creating an inde-
pendent self, balked at the very suggestion that their moms
would know what kind of puzzle they should do or would
like to do.
In contexts in which an interdependent model of self is
prevalent, choice (or what may appear as “choice” to a
European American observer) may necessarily involve ref-
erencing others and adjusting to the preferences and expec-
tations of others. Choosing the common pen or working
diligently on the puzzle your mom has chosen need not
imply (as it might from an American independent perspec-
tive) conformity or a lack of personal preference or agency
but instead an active commitment to interdependence, to
fitting in and doing what is expected of you by a person
with whom you are in relationship and who knows you best.
The Denial of Choice
To further explore variation in the meaning and conse-
quences of choice, researchers have used a paradigm that
offers choice and then denies it. In one study comparing
European Americans with South Asian Indians, shoppers
were approached and were asked to evaluate one of five
nice pens (Savani, Markus, and Conner 2008). In a “free
choice” condition, participants were promised a free pen if
they would choose one pen, write with it, and then evaluate
it on a number of dimensions. In a second, “usurped choice”
condition, just as participants chose a particular pen, the
experimenter said, “I’m sorry, you can’t have that one, it is
my last,” and then gave the participant another pen to write
with and evaluate. The European American participants
were seemingly upset in this condition and gave a lower
rating to the pen in this condition than in the free choice
condition. The Indian respondents gave equally good ratings
to both pens. When queried about their responses, the Eu-
ropean Americans seemed to experience a threat to their
independent self. Many felt that something—their right to
express their personal preference—had been taken from
them. The Indians, in contrast, did not accord the oppor-
tunity to choose with the same significance. They seemed
to think the experimenter must have needed the pen for some
reason and did not experience the denial of choice as a threat
to the self.
The Construal of Choice
When choice is so significant in defining and expressing
the self, as appears to be the case for European Americans,
people are likely to be on the lookout for choice and to
perceive their worlds in terms of the opportunities for choice.
A recent study (Savani et al. 2010) required participants to
complete a series of 12 actions to complete an experiment
(e.g., sit down in a cubicle, select a pen or pencil, fill out
one of several forms). Each action required selecting among
alternatives (e.g., there were four empty cubicles, and par-
ticipants had to select one in which to sit down and begin
the study). At the end of the study, all participants had
completed the exact same series of actions. They were then
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asked how many choices they had made during the study.
The European Americans believed they had made eight
choices, while the Indians claimed they had made fewer
than four choices. Americans are more likely than Indians
to construe a particular action as a choice.
Construing an action as a choice may be one mechanism
by which Americans realize their sense of independence and
freedom. In these studies, participants who have the op-
portunity to choose or to focus on choice, compared with
those who do not, describe themselves as feeling more free
and also more happy. By construing an action as a choice,
people are likely to feel that they have freely acted out of
their own volition. In contrast, in Indian contexts in which
good actions are those that are responsive to others, the
construal of choice in noninterpersonal contexts does not
hold this special meaning. Notably, these studies also reveal
that as Indian respondents spend more time in U.S. settings,
they look more like European Americans, construing more
actions as choices.
An extension of these studies required participants to
make a choice or to watch a film of another person making
routine choices (among drinks, CDs, and articles of clothing)
and then asked them to evaluate how responsible people
were for a series of bad outcomes that befell another person
(e.g., injury, illness, divorce, or loss of money, employment,
or status). Among European American participants, but not
among Indian participants, merely observing another person
making choices significantly increased the belief that people
were responsible for their own bad outcomes. Moreover,
watching the same film and noting how many times the
actor touched an object did not produce this effect. These
results suggest that for European Americans, a focus on
choice highlights the independent model of self and the
importance of self-expression and control through choice.
This focus on choice enhances the importance of the indi-
vidual’s contribution to a given outcome.
Other similar studies found that after observing another
person make a choice, European American participants were
less likely to support actions that might improve the fate of
others than European American participants who did not
observe another person make a choice (Savani, Markus, and
Stephens 2009). In particular, they were less willing to en-
dorse affirmative action or to support policies that might
expand the social safety net. A focus on choice, then, can
heighten a sense of being in control and of personal re-
sponsibility for one’s actions, but it can also distract people
from the consideration of other factors that are likely to
have contributed to a given outcome. Such findings could
have a variety of powerful societal consequences. Most
broadly, the view that life outcomes are primarily a result
of personal choice can motivate people to work hard, persist
longer, and produce more while fueling a sense of self-
efficacy and control. At the same time, however, this view
may blind people to the many contextual and structural
sources of inequality in health, wealth, and well-being. This
in turn can foster self-blame and depression when one’s own
outcomes do not meet one’s expectations, and racism, class-
ism, and other forms of discrimination when the outcomes
of others do not meet expectations (see Stephens et al. [2009]
and also Gladwell [2009] for a discussion of how American
attitudes about achievement are permeated by assumptions
of individual responsibility).
Choice and Others
Traditionally, social scientists have focused almost ex-
clusively on choices made in the absence of any relational
concerns and have assumed choices to be a “pure” or direct
expression of one’s preferences. Yet in these circumstances,
researchers do know that people in North American contexts
often worry over the adequacy of their choices. They worry,
for example, that they may not have made a good choice
and, thus, that they may not be seen as smart, competent,
or rational choosers. When a choice is self-defining or ex-
pressive of one’s preferences, revealing oneself to be a good
chooser really matters. This concern or anxiety is at the
heart of what social psychologists call cognitive dissonance
(Aronson 1992; Cooper and Fazio 1989; Festinger 1962;
Steele 1988). This dissonance, or worry over whether one
has made a good choice, motivates people to justify the
choices they have made so that their preferences will be
better aligned with their choices. Typically what happens is
that one’s preferences for chosen items increase, while one’s
preferences for unchosen items decrease.
Yet when people are organizing their actions and their
worlds with an interdependent model of self, this worry or
dissonance about their choices happens only when they are
explicitly thinking about other people or when they are
choosing for others. For example, one study (Kitayama et
al. 2002) asked participants to rate how much they liked 10
popular CDs they did not own and then offered them a
choice between their fifth- and sixth-ranked CDs. European
American participants increased their rating for the CD they
chose and decreased the rating of the CD they did not
choose. There was no such effect, however, for the Japanese
participants in their studies. Yet when participants were re-
quired explicitly to think about others and to estimate the
preferences of the average student of their own university
before making their choice, the Japanese participants showed
a very strong dissonance effect. They increased how much
they liked the chosen CD. Another study invited both Eu-
ropean Canadian and Asian Canadian participants to come
to the lab with a best friend. Participants were offered a
coupon for a Chinese dish in a campus cafeteria as a reward
(Hoshino-Browne et al. 2005). Participants were asked to
indicate their preferences among dishes, to choose one of
the dishes for a friend, and then to indicate their preferences
once again. Given the task of choosing for a friend, Asian
Canadians but not European Americans boosted their rating
of the dish they choose.
What the research discussed above tells us is that to un-
derstand choices, one must understand their meaning (not-
withstanding the assumptions of the theory of revealed pref-
erence). Choices are full of meaning, but often not the same
meanings. They may not, for example, express one’s per-
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sonal preferences. Instead, they may signal the nature of
one’s relationships with others and a concern with social
approval or accountability. Independent selves are centrally
defined by their internal attributes, such as their personal
preferences, and a choice that puts these internal preferences
on the line and highlights one’s freedom or autonomy is
likely to be a psychologically significant one; it will motivate
behavior and require justifying. Interdependent selves are
centrally defined by their relationships with others. Choices
that highlight one’s autonomy are less psychologically sig-
nificant than are choices that highlight one’s relationships
(one’s duty, connection, and obligation) to others. These are
the choices that jump-start action and provoke people to
worry about and to strive to explain.
The types of cross-national comparisons reported here
have many implications for what will count as a good choice
and for whether preferences can be reliably inferred from
choices. They demonstrate that what makes a choice mean-
ingful and when and why a choice needs justifying varies
significantly with cultural context. Choice is likely to be a
meaningful action everywhere, but it need not imply or
result in greater autonomy or individual freedom or well-
being. Most important for our argument, these comparative
studies matter because they reveal that whereas choice, free-
dom, autonomy, and well-being may be connected, as in the
opening syllogism, it is less a matter of logic than a matter
of culture. The opening syllogism is self-evident only if we
assume an independent model of self. The connections
among these concepts are not necessary, invariant, or uni-
versal.
Choice and Educational Attainment
Studies comparing European Americans and South and
East Asians demonstrate that choice is significant because
it activates and promotes an independent model of the self.
But is this independent model of self uniformly available
in American settings? Are all Americans equally likely to
construct themselves and their actions with this model? Re-
cent studies suggest, in fact, that the desire for choice, as
well as the benefits that are sometimes associated with
choice, may be confined to a particular group of Ameri-
cans—middle-class North Americans. Social class, like na-
tion or origin, is a label for a set of social experiences. A
growing literature in psychology, anthropology, and soci-
ology reveals that this set of experiences can have a powerful
impact on individuals, affecting not only how they think,
feel, and act but also how healthy they are and how long
they live (e.g., Adler et al. 1994; Johnson and Krueger 2005;
Kusserow 1999; Lareau 2003). With respect to choice, for
example, one’s social class sets up how often and among
what kinds of options one gets to choose: working-class
Americans have fewer opportunities to choose as well as
lower-quality options among which to choose than do mid-
dle-class Americans.
Social class is notoriously difficult to define, especially
in the United States, where there is little everyday conver-
sation about social class differences and where the majority
of people define themselves as middle class. Educational
attainment, income, and occupation all contribute to social
class. Educational attainment is often used as a indicator of
social class because it is relatively easy to measure. More-
over, attaining a college degree is increasingly important for
securing many of the types of professional jobs that provide
a substantial advantage in lifetime earnings (Day and New-
burger 2002; Pascarella and Terenzini 1991). Finally, edu-
cation is the best predictor of a wide range of beliefs and
lifestyle practices (Davis 1994). Despite the fact that Amer-
icans live within a common ideological, political, legal, and
media framework and share many ideas and practices, level
of education can create a powerful division between people
with a high school education (here called working class)
and people with a college education (here called middle
class). Although the figure varies by age group, overall, 29%
of Americans have completed a four-year college degree.
Why might social class make such a difference for behavior
and for choice in particular?
Middle-class American contexts (contexts in which most
people have a college education or are in a position to go
to college) offer access to economic capital, geographic mo-
bility, and opportunities for choice and control (Kohn 1969;
Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Stephens et al. 2007). Moreover, so-
cialization practices in these middle-class settings often in-
volve “concerted cultivation” or careful attention to elabo-
rating children’s personal preferences and interests (Lareau
2003). For example, parents offer children opportunities for
choice and self-expression and thereby convey to them a
sense of entitlement and of their own importance (Miller,
Cho, and Bracey 2005).
Working-class American contexts (contexts in which most
people have a high school education and are not in a position
to go to college), by contrast, offer less economic capital,
more environmental constraints, and workplaces and com-
munities with less choice and control than middle-class con-
texts (Kohn and Schooler 1983; Lachman and Weaver
1998). Moreover, socialization practices in these working-
class settings are often less child-centered and convey to
children that the world is not just about them. While middle-
class parents emphasize self-direction, many working-class
parents teach children to know their place and to consider
others’ preferences and interests before their own (Miller et
al. 2005; Stephens et al. 2009). Because fitting in with others
and following socially accepted rules and standards for be-
havior is often an important route to upward mobility, work-
ing-class environments are relatively likely to stress con-
formity to standards and the importance of showing respect
for and deference to authority (Kohn 1969; Miller et al.
2005).
Studies of occupations reveal that opportunities for choice
and control are not, in fact, uniformly distributed. They are
decidedly more likely in jobs and careers associated with
middle-class standing (e.g., Kohn and Schooler 1983; Mar-
kus et al. 2004; Ryff and Marshall 1999). Lamont (2000),
in an in-depth comparative study of working-class and mid-
dle-class employees in both the United States and France,
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reports that working-class respondents are less focused on
themselves and are relatively more aware of their interde-
pendence with others and the importance of responsibility
to others.
Notably, interdependence is common in both East Asian
and American working-class contexts, but it has different
sources and functions. Interdependence in East Asian con-
texts is part of the dominant discourse and is fostered by
mainstream practices and institutions of the larger society
(e.g., Stephens et al. 2007, 2009), whereas the interdepen-
dence in American working-class contexts seems to be pri-
marily a function of holding a lower status within the larger
social hierarchy (Lorenzi-Cioldi 1998).
In short, independence is the dominant narrative in main-
stream American life, and all Americans are exposed to the
idea of the independent model of the self. Yet the material
and social conditions that provide the supports and oppor-
tunities for people to construct themselves and their actions
as independent are more common in middle-class contexts
than in working-class contexts. Middle-class contexts are
arranged so as to repeatedly promote choice and the ex-
pression of the independent self through choice. In contrast,
the specific social and material conditions of working-class
contexts tend to promote interdependence by fostering a
greater adjustment to, reliance on, and attention to others
(cf. Miller 1976).
Since working-class contexts are arranged differently and
require responsiveness and interdependence with others,
choice based on one’s own preferences may not carry the
same associations with freedom, autonomy, and well-being
as it does in middle-class contexts. In an initial look at this
hypothesis, one study asked college students from working-
class families and college students from middle-class fam-
ilies to generate three words associated with “choice.” No-
tably, both groups of students responded with a greater
percentage of positive than negative associations. Yet a
higher percentage of working-class students responded with
“fear,” “doubt,” and “difficulty,” while more of the middle-
class respondents said “freedom” and “independence” (Ste-
phens, Fryberg, and Markus 2010). This study is consistent
with the idea that working-class and middle-class partici-
pants both value choice. They are likely to differ in their
responses to choice situations, however, because their im-
mediate social contexts differ in their opportunities for
choice among good alternatives and also in the consequences
that follow from the wrong choice or a bad choice.
To explore the notion that the links among choice, free-
dom, and well-being may vary with social class, many of
the studies carried out in the East-West comparisons reported
above have also been carried out in U.S. settings and have
contrasted the responses of middle-class Americans with
working-class Americans. In a replication of the pen choice
study, working-class Americans were much less likely than
middle-class Americans to choose the unique pen and
showed no preference for choosing their own pen versus
accepting a previously chosen pen (Stephens et al. 2007).
In other studies, they showed no tendency to justify or ex-
plain their choices. When given a opportunity to choose
between their fifth- and sixth-ranked CDs in the dissonance
paradigm described earlier, they did not evaluate the CD
they chose more positively than the one they did not choose
(Snibbe and Markus 2005). When presented with the op-
portunity to accept a thank-you gift selected by an experi-
menter or to choose one for themselves, working-class re-
spondents, unlike middle-class respondents, preferred to
accept the gift from the experimenter (Stephens et al. 2010).
Just as it does in East Asian contexts, in working-class
American contexts a choice based on one’s own preference
seems to have a different meaning than it does in middle-
class American contexts. A series of studies show that while
middle-class participants often use choice to express their
individuality—their independent self—working-class partic-
ipants are likely to use choice to signal what they have in
common with others, their interdependent self (Stephens et
al. 2007). In one study, middle-class participants and work-
ing-class participants were asked to describe how they would
feel if a friend purchased the same car as they did. Middle-
class participants responded negatively to this scenario. One
said, “I’d be disappointed because my car is no longer
unique.” In contrast, working-class participants responded
positively to a friend’s choice of the same car. One replied,
“Cool. Let’s start a car club!” An accompanying study
showed how these different norms of expressing uniqueness
versus expressing solidarity are apparent in the different
cultural products that working-class and middle-class Amer-
icans consume. Magazine ads targeting middle-class con-
sumers more often encourage people to make unique choices
(e.g., an Audi ad says, “Never follow”), whereas ads tar-
geting working-class consumers mention other people (e.g.,
a Toyota ad says, “Dropping the kid off at college”).
To examine whether working-class respondents are less
likely to construe their actions in terms of choice, a team
of researchers interviewed survivors of Hurricane Katrina
and asked them to describe what happened to them before,
during, and after the hurricane (Stephens et al. 2009). Com-
pared with working-class black survivors, middle-class
white survivors (who often had the material resources to
evacuate) more often described their actions as choices and
themselves as influencing the environment through inde-
pendence and control. In contrast, working-class black sur-
vivors (who often lacked the material resources to evacuate)
more often described themselves as adjusting to the envi-
ronment by remaining strong in the face of hardship, caring
for others, and maintaining their faith in God. These findings
point to an additional consequence of the widespread Amer-
ican independent model of self—the assumption that choice
is equally available and beneficial to all. In the case of
Hurricane Katrina, for example, well-resourced, far-re-
moved observers drawing on their own independent model
of self readily concluded that survivors who did not evacuate
in the face of the storm “chose” to stay. But, in fact, for
many impoverished New Orleans residents, nothing about
the events of Katrina was a matter of choice.
Together these studies suggest how both attitudes toward
CHOICE, FREEDOM, CULTURE, AND WELL-BEING 351
choice and opportunities to choose diverge across social
classes. Middle-class Americans have more opportunities to
choose and view choices more positively and therefore cre-
ate worlds that offer them more choices and more positive
representations of choice. In sum, this research reveals that
choice has different meanings and consequences for people
who have and who lack the resources to choose. The pro-
liferation of choice may provide positive consequences for
the more affluent members of American society. Yet it is
unlikely to hold even these potentially positive conse-
quences for the many working-class Americans with rela-
tively fewer opportunities and resources. And to make mat-
ters worse, the continual proliferation of choice has a set of
far-ranging, unforeseen societal consequences. For example,
as mentioned above, it appears to strengthen the belief
among Americans in middle-class contexts that all people
are alike in their opportunity to choose. This belief in turn
fuels the idea that people are responsible for their circum-
stances, and it can reduce a sense of connection with or
empathy for those whose circumstances provide many fewer
opportunities to choose among good options.
In sum, these studies comparing people living in different
social class contexts are a further demonstration that choice,
freedom, autonomy, and well-being are not inevitably
linked. They need not imply one another or follow logically
one from the other. The opening syllogism may indeed hold,
but only in well-resourced contexts, like those of the North
American middle class, that support an independent model
of the self.
TOO MUCH CHOICE, EVEN FOR THE
MIDDLE CLASS
One could read the evidence reviewed above, acknowl-
edge that the relationship between choice, freedom, and
well-being depends on culture and class, and nonetheless
conclude that all people should be aspiring to live lives like
those of the European American middle class. That is, one
could assume an Enlightenment-inspired, individualistic
stance toward human nature and human possibility, see it
most clearly embodied in the American middle class, and
then work to give others the same opportunities. Such a
stance might make sense if the empirical evidence suggested
that freedom of choice provides people with unalloyed psy-
chological benefits. But research in the past decade makes
that suggestion implausible. There is evidence that whereas
choice is good, more choice is not better, at least under some
circumstances. Choice overload can produce paralysis, poor
decisions, and dissatisfaction with even good decisions. The
relevant literature on consumer choice overload and its limits
is no doubt familiar to readers of this journal and will not
be discussed here (for demonstrations and discussion of
choice overload, see Botti and Iyengar [2004], Botti, Orfali,
and Iyengar [2009], Hanoch et al. [2009], Iyengar and
DeVoe [2003], Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman [2004], Iyen-
gar and Lepper [1999, 2002], Rice and Hanoch [2008], and
Schwartz [2004]; for a discussion of its limits, see Chernev
[2003] and Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd [2009]).
We will focus instead on potential consequences of choice
overload for conceptions and construals of the self. “What
should I buy?” is of less significance than “What should I
do with my life?” or “Who should I be?” Moreover, it is in
connection with these identity-shaping decisions that the
benefits of freedom and autonomy (i.e., choice) loom largest.
There is little doubt (Schwartz 2000, 2004) that freedom
of choice in these self-defining domains has expanded along
with freedom of choice in the world of goods. Young people,
at least middle-class young people, find themselves with
relatively unconstrained choices when it comes to where
they live, what they study, what kind of work they do, what
religion they practice and how they practice it, what kind
of intimate relations they will enter into, what kind of family
commitments they will make, and even what kind of person
they will be. And having made decisions like these, people
are also free to change them. No longer are people “stuck”
with the identities and life paths that accidents of birth or
the views of others have imposed on them. Self-invention
and reinvention is now a real option. And occasional pa-
ralysis in the cereal aisle of the supermarket seems a small
price to pay for this kind of liberation.
Philosopher Charles Taylor (1989, 1992a, 1992b) points
out that over the past five hundred years, self-understanding
(at least in the West) has been moving in a more or less
straight line from “outside-in,” through participation in
larger entities (the divine order, the “great chain of being,”
nation, community, family, etc.), to “inside-out,” with pur-
pose discovered from within each individual and the notion
of “authentic” self-expression as the supreme aspiration. We
in the West have seen this evolution as progress, each step
enhancing freedom, and we have occasionally been quick
to essentialize this view and to assume it must be true for
humans everywhere, even those whose history and whose
cultural ideas and practices are very different from our own
North American ones. We find it hard to imagine thinking
about our lives in any other way.
But the work we reviewed above on cultural differences
in notions of freedom and choice, along with earlier work
(e.g., Markus and Kitayama 1994) contrasting East Asian
and Western cultures, has shown that this movement from
“outside-in” to “inside-out” is not universal: in East Asian
contexts, people define themselves in terms of their relations
to others. This research does not challenge the notion that
within Western culture, more freedom—more “inside-
out”—is better. However, it is possible that East Asians may
know something that Westerners, in their pursuit of inde-
pendence and their emphasis on individual choice, have for-
gotten.
Consistent with this possibility, there is evidence that the
most significant determinant of our well-being is our net-
work of close relations to other people (e.g., Diener 2000;
Diener and Biswas-Diener 2008; Diener, Diener, and Diener
1995; Diener et al. 1985; Diener and Suh 2001; Diener et
al. 1999; Lane 2000; Myers 2000). The more connected we
are, the better off we are. The thing to notice about close
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relationships, in connection with freedom, choice, and au-
tonomy, is that close relationships constrain; they do not
liberate. When people have responsibilities and concerns
about other people, they cannot just do anything they want.
Until now, the thought has been that this constraint is per-
haps just a price worth paying for rich social ties. But it is
possible that with the overwhelming choice now character-
istic of every aspect of life, the constraints of close rela-
tionships with others may actually be part of the benefit of
those relationships rather than a cost. And like close rela-
tionships with others, “outside-in” definitions of the self
provide significant constraints on what is possible, con-
straints that, in modern Western societies, may be desper-
ately needed (see Markus and Nurius [1986] and Schlenker
[1985] for a discussion of social and cultural constraints on
self-definition found at other times and in other cultures).
What is the evidence that modern Westerners are suffering
from this lack of constraint? First, there has been a signif-
icant rise in the incidence of clinical depression, anxiety
disorder, and suicide, all of which are befalling people at
younger and younger ages (e.g., Angst 1995; Eckersley
2002; Eckersley and Dear 2002; Klerman et al. 1985; Kler-
man and Weissman 1989; Lane 2000; Myers 2000; Rosen-
han and Seligman 1995; Twenge 2006). Second, there is a
substantial increase in the rate at which college students are
seeking help in counseling centers (Kadison and DiGer-
onimo 2004). Third, there is a palpable unease in the reports
of young college graduates, who seem to lack a clear idea
of what they are meant to do in their lives (Robbins and
Wilner 2001; Twenge 2006). And finally, for upper-class
adolescents, whose family affluence makes anything pos-
sible, there are the same levels of drug abuse, anxiety dis-
order, and depression as there are for the children of the
poor and a higher frequency of drug use for self-medication
rather than recreation (Luthar and Latendresse 2005).
CONCLUSION: FREEDOM FROM AND
FREEDOM TO
Philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1958) made a classic distinc-
tion in discussing freedom half a century ago. Berlin dis-
tinguished between what he called “negative and positive
liberty”—freedom from and freedom to. The primary his-
torical focus of the American embrace of freedom has been
“freedom from.” The Bill of Rights, the bible of American
freedom, is all about freedom from, as it limits the power
of the state to intrude in the lives of its citizens. With the
meddling of the state kept at bay, “freedom to” is pretty
much up to each of us. That is, there are no guarantees that
the conditions needed for Americans to live rich, meaning-
ful, and satisfying lives will be present.
Choice is good. It is essential in enabling people to have
the opportunity to live the kinds of lives they want. But
choice is not always and only good, and it does not mean
the same thing to all people in all contexts and all cultures.
Further, the relationship between choice and freedom is
complex. Though one cannot be free without choice, it is
arguable that the choice-induced paralysis that is sometimes
observed is a sign of diminished rather than enhanced free-
dom.
If people can come to see that the meaning of choice and
the relationship between choice and freedom are socially
constructed, and that sometimes the social construction that
educated Westerners take for granted can be debilitating
rather than liberating, they may seek and embrace some
constraints in their own lives instead of trying to avoid all
of them. They may come to understand, as they seek to live
meaningful and fulfilling lives, that in the pursuit of hap-
piness, the expression of personal preference and more
choice may not always be the only or the right thing to
pursue or demand.
If we pay more attention to “freedom to”—to the con-
ditions that enable the living of good lives—it may turn out
that there can be too much “freedom from.” That is, a good
life may require constraints, whether imposed by the self,
the state, the family, the school, or religious and cultural
institutions. We have shown that whether constraint is per-
ceived as a threat to freedom is itself governed by a cultural
and class-based understanding of what freedom means.
Greater progress on the part of psychologists and other social
scientists in determining what the constituents of a good life
are may embolden them to offer suggestions about which
kinds of constraints are needed and why. And greater at-
tention to lives as lived by people other than the ones who
dominate modern research—both as participants and as re-
searchers—may open up awareness of the possibility that,
sometimes, the embrace of constraints enriches lives rather
than impoverishing them.
Once we understand that the relationship between choice,
freedom, and well-being may depend on culture and class,
as well as a variety of other significant social distinctions,
and once we acknowledge that the relationship between
choice and well-being may be nonmonotonic, even among
those for whom choice really is another word for freedom,
a variety of important and challenging research questions
open up.
1. How much choice is “enough”? Are there individual
differences, domain differences, and culture and class dif-
ferences in the answer to this question?
2. Does the amount of choice available to people in a
particular domain of life influence whether decisions in that
domain become part of the definition of self and thus grow
in importance? For example, it is possible to imagine that
when jeans come in only a few styles, one’s choice of jeans
says little about the self because there is not enough variety
to differentiate among the many different possible “selves.”
However, when jeans come in thousands of styles, brands,
and colors, it becomes possible for one’s choice of jeans to
say something about who one is. This raises the stakes of
decisions about jeans and makes mistakes more consequen-
tial.
3. Must an abundance of choice make people selfish and
uncaring? Will increasing choice, increasing individualism,
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and increasing societal inequality always go hand in hand?
Do they recruit and foster each other?
4. What takes the place of “choice” as the source of action,
motivation, pride, self, and identity in cultural contexts in
which choice is not celebrated as it is among the North
American middle class? We suggest here that it is meeting
or adjusting to the expectations of important others. Are
there other important drivers of behavior, and do they rival
choice in their robust behavioral consequences?
5. What will be the result of the proliferation of choice
in cultural contexts where choice has not been the predom-
inant historical and philosophical focus? Will the increasing
abundance of choice contribute to happiness or well-being
in contexts that now emphasize interdependence? Does
abundance of choice undermine interdependence, or will the
existence of interdependent values and practices inoculate
consumers against the unhappiness sometimes caused by too
much choice?
By tackling questions like these, we can begin to develop
a nuanced understanding and assessment of the syllogism
with which this article began.
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